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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyse the influence of individual’s previous labour market experiences on the duration
of subsequent job matches in the Spanish labour market. The study draws on a sample of workers extracted from a
Spanish administrative dataset. We find evidence on the existence of a scarring effect: the longer the time spent in
non-employment since previous job separation, the shorter the duration of subsequent re-employment relationships.
Other result is that workers whose previous job match terminated due to the ending of a temporary contract are very
likely to come back to employment under another temporary job and have a higher probability of job termination.
The exhaustion of unemployment benefits also seems to exert a scarring effect on job duration.
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1. Introduction
In the 1980s, the Spanish Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) was changed with
the objective of favouring employment creation through increased labour market flexibility.
In particular, a major reform took place in 1984 that permitted temporary contracts —entail-
ing much lower dismissal costs than the regular permanent contracts— to be used for reasons
other than the temporary nature of the job. The aim was that firms could adjust employment
more easily without having to change separation rules for permanent contracts. As a result,
the proportion of total wage and salary workers having a temporary contract surged during
the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s until reaching one third of total employees
in 1992.
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During the 1990s, despite other labour market reforms (in particular, those in 1997 and
2001) trying to provide a less stringent EPL for permanent contracts and some restrictions to
the use of fixed-term contracts, the share of temporary employees remained above 30 per
cent. In fact, temporary contracts accounted for more than 90 per cent of new hires (the ma-
jority under fixed-term contracts, since other type of temporary contracts such as seasonal,
probationary, etc., have remained relatively unimportant).
Thus, in a short period of time the Spanish labour market has became a «dual» labour
market with different consequences (see Dolado et al., 2002). One of them is the rise of rota-
tion. This is certainly behind the evolution of total public expenditure on unemployment pro-
tection and of the number of beneficiaries. It can be argued that the combination of the EPL
and the design of the unemployment compensation system in association with increased ro-
tation have influenced the behaviour of workers and firms, which in certain cases has re-
sulted in a strategic use of unemployment benefits on the part of both agents, alternating pe-
riods of employment with periods of covered unemployment 1.
In addition, if rotation is important and mean duration of employment spells is low, ac-
tive labour market programmes —which aim at improving job prospects of the unemployed
with the objective of achieving higher levels of employment— can be inefficient, as one ob-
vious risk of those programmes is that they can be successful to move the unemployed into
work in the short-run but these individuals return quickly to unemployment. In other words,
for such policy to be efficient it requires that the unemployed who find a job remain in em-
ployment for some time.
Finally, it may be the case that those individuals who suffer job interruptions and spend
some time in unemployment not only experience likely earnings losses due to the spells of
interruption but are also «scarred» by their experience of unemployment. In this case, the ex-
istence of costs linked to unemployment may motivate concern over the long-term prospects
of those individuals and the most appropriate assistance policies for them. Therefore, under-
standing whether the costs of job interruptions are persistent and what circumstances may in-
fluence that persistence is an important step toward developing such policies.
In that context, the analysis of the likely relationship between previous and subsequent
labour market experiences may provide additional insights on the knowledge of those costs.
The issue of earning losses associated with spells of interruption has been previously docu-
mented in many empirical studies for the US (Hamermesh, 1987; Podgursky and Swaim,
1987b; Farber, 1993; Jacobson et al., 1993; Stevens, 1997) and the UK labour markets
(Arulampalam, 2001, and Gregory and Jukes, 2001). Evidence for other European econo-
mies are much more limited and less conclusive (Ackum, 1991, for Sweden; and Burda and
Mertens, 2001, for Germany).
The effect of unemployment incidence and/or duration on future unemployment or sub-
sequent job tenure has been less studied. On the one hand, the US evidence suggests that dis-
placed workers face more unemployment than non-displaced workers (Podgursky and
Swaim, 1987a; Ruhm, 1991). There is also international evidence on that individual’s previ-
ous unemployment experience affects future unemployment occurrence (Arulampalam et
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al., 2000, and Gregg, 2001, for the UK; Muhleisen and Zimmermann, 1994, for Germany;
and Omori, 1997, for the US). On the other hand, studies on the effect of unemployment inci-
dence and duration on subsequent job tenure are scarce. For Britain, Booth et al. (1999) find
that the most recent labour history affects current job tenure (for instance, a layoff in the pre-
vious job has a positive impact on the layoff hazard in the following job). Results from
Böheim and Taylor (2002) suggest that jobs following an unemployment spell have shorter
mean duration than other jobs and that unemployment incidence rather than duration has the
major severe penalty on subsequent job tenure.
Recent Spanish studies have shown that past non-employment incidence and duration
have scarring effects on unemployed workers either in terms of wages (Arranz and
García-Serrano, 2003b) or future unemployment experiences (Arranz and Muro, 2001).
However, the impact of non-employment spells on subsequent job tenure has not investi-
gated yet in the Spanish literature 2. This will be the main purpose of this paper: to contribute
evidence on how future job durations are affected by the length of previous non-employment
spells using Spanish data. In addition, it will also analyse the effect of the reason for previous
job termination (ending of a contract or layoff) on the exit rate (or the duration) of subse-
quent employments accepted by the unemployed.
The data we use in this study were obtained from the Spanish administrative dataset
HSIPRE (Histórico del Sistema de Prestaciones por Desempleo). The main advantage of this
database lies in that it contains retrospective information on the last job prior to the unem-
ployment experience, including workers’ wage, employment duration and job category. This
information makes it possible to construct a labour history of a subsample of Spanish work-
ers (those who received unemployment benefits at least twice) over the 1980s and the 1990s
and to use their first two employment spells and the intervening non-employment spell to
analyse the aforementioned issues. The main drawback is that this subsample excludes indi-
viduals who have been separated from their jobs without having the right of receiving unem-
ployment benefits (quitters and job-to-job changers) and those who have received them once.
The rest of this work is organised as follows. Section two describes the construction of
the dataset and the sample restrictions. Section three presents some descriptive statistics.
Section four provides the results from the estimation of an independent competing risks
framework to model the duration of job matches with previous labour market information
and individual and job characteristics. Finally, some concluding remarks follow in section
five.
2. Data and sample
In this section, we describe how we have extracted the data from the original dataset and
what type of sample restrictions we have imposed in order to investigate the influence of
non-employment on job duration upon re-employment.
The influence of previous labour market experiences on subsequent job tenure 49
2.1. Constructing the data
Our investigation draws on data coming from longitudinal linkage of records from
monthly payroll computer files for all registered unemployed workers who receive all types
of unemployment benefits from the Spanish public agency (INEM, Instituto Nacional de
Empleo) in charge of the administration of the payment of unemployment benefits.
The original administrative data, the Benefits Integrated System (SIPRE, Sistema Inte-
grado de Prestaciones), can be defined as a cross-section, since it comes from the monthly
payroll computer tapes of unemployment recipients. It registers claims of unemployment in-
surance (UI) and unemployment assistance (UA) benefits by all fully unemployed workers
as well as some of those partially unemployed (i.e. on short-time work) 3. From those
monthly tapes information on individual entries to the Unemployment Compensation Sys-
tem (UCS) were extracted so that their evolution therein could be followed. This was under-
taken by INEM with the purpose of facilitating the management of the system, thus allowing
a complete month-by-month follow-up of recipients. This new longitudinal database has
been named the «historical» SIPRE (HSIPRE). We constructed our longitudinal data from a
40 per cent representative random sample of all unemployed workers who started their UI or
UA spell either in February, June, or November over the period 1987-1997 4.
All that means that the HSIPRE gives information on spells of benefit receipt for each
individual, being that information collected at the moment of entry in the UCS and during
the ongoing unemployment spell. But what becomes essential for our purposes is that col-
lected information relates not only to individual characteristics (age, gender, number of chil-
dren, region where benefit is paid) and benefit parameters (level and duration) of covered un-
employment spells but also to some important features of the former employment
relationship. More precisely, information is gathered on the duration of previous job, reason
for separation (mainly, ending of temporary contract, collective layoff or individual layoff),
former job category (a proxy for occupation and educational attainment), and former wage
(the average wage on the latest six months of employment) 5.
Therefore, we always have information on the previous employment relationship, which
generated the right to receiving unemployment benefits (either UI or UA) for each individual
entering the UCS. This means that we are able to construct «labour histories» for those indi-
viduals: we know the duration of former job (and other characteristics of the employment re-
lationship), the date of job termination (and hence the date of entry into the UCS), and the
date of exit from non-employment (for those finding a job before benefit exhaustion, we
know the date of exit and, thus, the date of entry into a new job engagement; and for those
exhausting the UI entitlement period, we can add information on duration of UA benefits if
received and on duration of non-employment otherwise).
2.2. Sample restrictions
To be included in the analysis the individuals should meet some criteria. First, they must
have entered the UCS for the first time in any of the months selected for the analysis (Febru-
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ary, June, or November) over the period 1987-1997. Second, they must be in full unemploy-
ment; this means that we have excluded those entering covered unemployment due to either
temporary layoffs or short-time work. Third, they were in paid employment obtaining a
wage equal to or greater than the statutory minimum wage (SMW) and working full-time.
Fourth, they must have an entitlement period (expressed in days) which corresponds with the
legal provisions; this implies that we have also excluded those workers whose entitlement
period do not correspond to those provisions (taking into account the reform introduced in
April 1992 which modified the potential entitlement spells). Fifth, to avoid problems associ-
ated with the current employment status, we exclude self-employment. Sixth, we limit our
sample to workers aged between 20 and 52 at the moment of first entry into the UCS (to
avoid complications associated with early retirement). Seventh, we have selected all workers
for whom all the individual, job and unemployment spell characteristics are present; only in
the case of the job category variable observations with missing values were not omitted from
the sample, since they accounted for a 7 per cent of the total sample (an appropriate category
for missing cases is used as an additional regressor). Finally, we restrict the sample to those
workers who were present in our data in paid employment in at least two employment spells
(with at least one intervening non-employment spell).
After implementing all previous restrictions, the sample consists of 65,340 workers who
first ever entered the UCS over the period 1987-1997 and experience at least two employ-
ment spells across the 1980s and 1990s. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A.1 in
the Appendix.
2.3. Some comments on the dataset and the sample
It is quite obvious that the HSIPRE and the subsample of workers we use may be not
representative of all Spanish labour market. First, HSIPRE information refers exclusively to
individuals who exit from employment into covered unemployment and eventually return
again to employment. Second, workers who quit, moved directly from job-to-job or have
never been involuntarily separated from their jobs are not contained in the database. Third, in
order to analyse the influence of previous labour market experience on subsequent job dura-
tion, we restrict the sample to workers with at least two employment spells (with at least one
intervening non-employment spell), since this is the only way of having information on two
successive job matches. This means that workers with one employment spell (passing only
once through the UCS) are excluded from the sample, since collecting information on subse-
quent job matches results impossible for those who never return to the UCS 6.
What are the likely effects of these drawbacks? We expect exit rates from employment
to be lower in our analysis due to the fact that we do not have information on those workers
(workers moving from job to job and from employment to uncovered unemployment). These
transitions would increase the censored observations when we analyse exits from employ-
ment that follow either the ending of a contract or a layoff. In spite of these restrictions, we
consider that HSIPRE remains as a useful database since it allows (thanks to its longitudinal
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information) analysing issues related to the labour market experience of Spanish workers
that can not be investigated with any other database 7.
3. Descriptive statistics
As we have mentioned, we are going to use information on workers for their first two job
matches and the intervening non-employment spell to analyse the influence of previous la-
bour market experiences on subsequent job duration. The HSIPRE dataset provides us with
information on some valuable variables related to workers’ previous labour market experi-
ences. In this section, we intend to give a flavour of the likely relationship between the rea-
son for termination of previous job and the duration of previous non-employment spell, on
the one hand, and the reason for termination of subsequent job and the duration of subse-
quent job, on the other hand. The basic data are provided in Table 1.
We first start by looking at the association between former and subsequent reason for job
termination. As we have mentioned previously, the dataset registers the reason for termina-
tion of employment relationships for all workers: the ending of a temporary contract, collec-
tive layoff, individual layoff, and others 8. Of all individuals who ever entered the UCS, 85
per cent of them terminated their first employment spell due to the ending of a temporary
contract, while 15 per cent entered into unemployment due to a layoff. Considering the ter-
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Table 1
Subsequent job duration (days) by reason for separation from previous job, duration of
previous non-employment spell (in months) and reason for separation from subsequent job
Total  6 months 6-24 months >24 months
% Mean % Mean % Mean % Mean
Exits from subsequent job due to:
End of contract 87.5 528.1 87.5 565.7 87.9 517.6 86.4 462.5
Layoff 12.5 917.7 12.5 1,091.9 12.1 858.1 13.5 661.6
Total 100.0 577.2 100.0 631.7 100.0 559.0 100.0 489.6
Exits from previous job due to the en-
ding of a temporary contract and from
subsequent job due to:
End of contract 90.7 511.2 91.4 541.3 90.5 501.0 89.0 454.0
Layoff 9.3 849.2 8.6 984.7 9.5 804.3 11.0 662.3
Total 100.0 542.6 100.0 579.4 100.0 529.8 100.0 476.9
Exits from previous job due to layoff
and from subsequent job due to:
End of contract 68.8 654.4 58.2 841.9 71.3 643 78.2 493.4
Layoff 31.2 1,035.6 41.8 1,255.9 28.7 962.1 21.8 661.3
Total 100.0 773.3 100.0 1,015.0 100.0 734.6 100.0 530.0
mination of the subsequent job match, again the majority (87.5 per cent) terminates in conse-
quence of the ending of temporary contracts and only 12.5 per cent due to a layoff (either in-
dividual or collective). All this is consistent with the fact that during the 1980s and 1990s
temporary contracts accounted for nearly all-new employment engagements in the Spanish
economy.
We can take an insight of the association between former and subsequent reason for job
termination comparing the distributions of workers by reason for subsequent job termination
between both categories of reason for previous job termination. In the case of those who first
entered unemployment due to the ending of a temporary contract, 90.7 per cent also ended
their next employment relationship due to the same reason. On the contrary, 68.8 per cent of
those who first entered unemployment due to a layoff finished their subsequent job match
due to the ending of a temporary contract. This seems to point out that there a certain (large)
proportion of individuals who are involved in a «temporary employment – unemployment –
temporary employment» cycle.
Turning to job duration, there are distinct differences among jobs defined according to
their reason for subsequent job termination. Employment relationships that terminate be-
cause the contracts expire are those with the shortest mean duration (528 days), while work-
ers who are laid off enjoyed job matches with longer mean duration (918 days) 9.
Reason for previous job termination clearly influences the job duration of subsequent
employment engagements. Mean duration of subsequent jobs accepted by workers whose
previous job matches terminated due to a layoff are higher than mean duration of subsequent
jobs accepted by workers whose previous job matches terminated due to the ending of a tem-
porary contract: 773 days vs. 543 days (a 43 per cent higher). In fact, mean duration for
workers whose first and second job matches terminated due to a layoff (1,036 days) doubles
mean duration for comparable workers whose first and second job matches terminated due to
the ending of a temporary contract (511 days).
We now turn to investigate the likely influence of previous non-employment duration on
subsequent job duration 10. For all workers, it holds that the longer the duration of the previ-
ous non-employment spell the shorter the duration of the subsequent employment spell. Dif-
ferences across categories of the non-employment duration variable are apparent. Mean job
duration is 632 days for workers whose non-employment spell was short (up to six months),
compared to 559 days for workers involved in medium-tenured non-employment spells (be-
tween six and twenty four months) and just 490 days for those workers whose non-employ-
ment spell was long (more than two years). This implies a difference of nearly five months
between the first and the third groups.
By reason for subsequent job termination, the association between longer past non-em-
ployment duration and shorter duration of subsequent job matches holds. This is specially
true for workers whose jobs terminate due to layoffs. Mean job duration amounts to three
years (1,092 days) for those whose former non-employment spell was short, compared to
less than two years for those whose former non-employment spell was long (662 days).
The influence of previous labour market experiences on subsequent job tenure 53
Finally, combining the effect of reason for termination of previous job, duration of pre-
vious non-employment duration and reason for termination of subsequent job on the duration
of subsequent job is highly interesting. Here, two findings arise. First, independently of the
reason for previous and subsequent job termination, the effect of past non-employment dura-
tion is always to reduce the duration of subsequent jobs. Second, comparable individuals
whose subsequent job terminated due to the same reason (either layoff or ending of a con-
tract) but their reason for previous job termination was different show distinct job durations:
the effect of the ending of contract in the previous job match is always to generate subse-
quent lower job durations in comparison with layoff in the previous job match. This also
holds for all categories of former non-employment duration.
To sum up, the information presented so far seems to provide evidence on that the rea-
son for termination of previous jobs influences the reason for termination of subsequent jobs:
a large proportion of jobs which terminated due to the ending of temporary contracts are fol-
lowed by new employment relationships involving temporary contracts. Moreover, mean job
duration of these jobs is shortest, compared even with temporary jobs found by workers who
first entered unemployment due to layoffs. Furthermore, workers who remain longer in
non-employment seem to gain access to consistently shorter job matches 11. This means that
there are specific categories of unemployed workers (in particular, those who come from
temporary employment and those with longer non-employment spells) that accept short-term
job matches or poor quality employment engagements characterised by having high destruc-
tion rates.
4. Multivariate analysis
4.1. Model specification
The empirical analysis of labour market transitions is usually based on the standard job
search theory (Mortensen, 1977; Lancaster, 1990). In this approach, the hazard rate from a
job could be modelled as the sum of three probabilities: the probability of a worker being laid
off, the probability of a job match being terminated due to the ending of a temporary con-
tract, and the probability of a worker quitting 12. This might be used as a starting point for a
structural model.
However, we will not try to specify a structural model but use the more common proce-
dure of specifying the hazard directly; that is, we will use a reduced-form specification. In
particular, we will estimate the determinants of job separations using a discrete time propor-
tional hazard model with competing risks of exits. This approach is referred in the literature
as an independent competing risk model, where the log-likelihood may be separated into the
sum of its risk specific hazards (Lancaster, 1990; Böheim and Taylor, 2002). In the compet-
ing risks model, we focus on exit rates from jobs than follow the ending of a temporary con-
tract and a layoff. Observations that exit to a different destination are treated as censored.
The virtue of this semi-parametric approach is that it is unnecessary to make parametric as-
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sumptions concerning the hazard’s time dependence. Formally, the hazard rate from a job
can be written as 13:
hij (t;Xij) = 0 (t) exp[Xij’]i [1]
Where 0(t) is the interval-specific baseline hazard rate, Xij is a vector of individual and
local labour characteristics which potentially may vary with time (calendar time or duration),
 is a vector of parameters to be estimated, i = 1 ... N are individuals-month observations, j
identify the competing risks (job matches terminated due to the ending of a temporary con-
tract or layoffs), and finally i captures unobserved individual characteristics that affect job
tenure such as motivation, ability, absenteeism, and so on. A convenient and commonly dis-
tribution used for unobserved heterogeneity is the gamma distribution (Meyer, 1990). It can
be shown that when  is gamma distributed with unit mean and variance  2, the log-likeli-
hood function becomes as follows (Meyer, 1990: 770) 14:
[2]
Where (t) is a function that describes duration dependence in the hazard rate and in-
cludes a set of dummy variables differing for each t allowing the hazard rate to vary
non-monotonically with job tenure; and di is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if individual
i’s spell ends in a transition (either ending of a contract or layoff) and 0 otherwise (observa-
tions which exit to a different destination are treated as censored).
4.2. Results
Table 2 provides the determinants of job duration using reasons for separation from sub-
sequent job as the competing risks. Two single risk estimations have been made based on the
likelihood function (2) by the maximum likelihood estimator 15. The first column reports es-
timated coefficients for exits from jobs that follow the end of a temporary contract and the
second column from jobs that follow a layoff. The descriptive statistics of the variables in-
cluded in the estimation can be found in the Appendix (Table A.1).
Our main variables of interest are those related to the individual’s previous labour mar-
ket experience. We have considered three sets of such variables. The first refers to the reason
for termination of the former employment relationship. As our sample consists of workers
who entered the UCS after having been employed, all of them come from previous job
matches which ended due to any of these two reasons: ending of a temporary contract or lay-
off.
Moreover, all workers have been in covered unemployment for some time. Therefore,
they all have been receiving unemployment benefits, but they differ in the time spent to exit
from the UCS before or after the time of benefits exhaustion. The second variable related to
previous labour market experience that we have included in the models thus captures the in-
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Table 2
Discrete time proportional hazard estimations for job duration: jobs terminating due to either
the ending of a temporary contract or a layoff (controlling for unobserved heterogeneity)
Variable
End of a contract
separation
Layoff separation
Coeff. Std. Signif. Coeff. Std. Signif.
Gender
Men –0.128 0.013 *** 0.055 0.030
Women — — — — — —
Age (years old)
> 20 and 4 25 — — — — — —
> 25 and 4 30 –0.544 0.015 *** –0.267 0.038 ***
> 30 and 4 35 –0.511 0.019 *** –0.329 0.048 ***
> 35 and 4 40 –0.391 0.024 *** –0.234 0.058 ***
> 40 and 4 45 –0.374 0.027 *** –0.154 0.064 ***
> 45 –0.581 0.028 *** –0.159 0.062 ***
Job category
High level/associated professional technicians
and supervisors 0.303 0.027 *** 0.860 0.058 ***
Technical assistants and skilled clerical workers –0.189 0.022 *** 0.578 0.047 ***
Semi-skilled clerical workers 0.186 0.030 *** –0.077 0.079
Unskilled clerical workers –0.125 0.020 *** 0.243 0.048 ***
Skilled production workers — — — — — —
Semi-skilled production workers 0.027 0.019 –0.012 0.047
Unskilled production workers 0.228 0.018 *** –0.089 0.048
Missing 0.095 0.037 *** –0.980 0.166 ***
Children
Yes 0.011 0.014 –0.059 0.033
No — — — — — —
Duration (months) in:
Previous employment –0.022 0.001 *** –0.013 0.001 ***
Previous non-employment 0.006 0.001 *** 0.021 0.001 ***
Reason for termination previous job matches
End of a contract 0.320 0.018 *** –0.841 0.040 ***
Layoff — — — — — —
Exhaustion previous unemployment benefits
Yes 0.281 0.015 *** 0.093 0.036 ***
No — — — — — —
Ln wages (€ in 1990) –0.862 0.021 *** –0.640 0.046 ***
Regional unemployment rate 0.002 0.002 0.052 0.006 ***
Gamma variance 0.412 0.022 *** 0.963 0.160 ***
*
2 (Prob > *2) 521.567(0.000) 80.177(0.000)
Log-likelihood –117,046.14 –30,257.084
Observations individual-months 402,918
Notes:
— Regression also controls for regions, calendar and business cycle dummies and duration dummies variables. *2
statistics refers to testing model with unobserved heterogeneity against that without.
— *** indicates significance at 1 per cent; ** indicates significance at 5 per cent.
dividual’s exhaustion state. Finally, the third group of variables refers to the duration (mea-
sured in months) of the individual’s immediately previous employment spell and non-em-
ployment spell. The reference categories for the first and second variables are that past
employment terminated due to a layoff and that the individual did not exhaust his or her pre-
vious unemployment benefits, respectively.
We first focus our attention on the estimations for the exit from a job due to the ending
of temporary contracts. The coefficient of the categorical variable controlling for the way the
previous employment relationship terminated is statistically significant with a positive sign.
This means that the hazard rate from a job due to the ending of a temporary contract is 38 per
cent higher if the prior job match also finished due to the same reason 16. This result suggests
that the reason for previous job termination influences the survival of future employment en-
gagements.
The duration of the previous employment and non-employment spells affects signifi-
cantly the hazard rate from a job, although in an opposite way. On the one hand, the hazard
rate decreases with duration in the previous job match. This implies that the higher the rel-
ative job stability experienced by workers in their previous employment engagements the
lower the exit rate from the subsequent job. On the other hand, the probability of job termi-
nation in the subsequent job match increases with duration in previous non-employment
spells.
The individual’s exhaustion state related to their previous unemployment spell also has a
significant impact on the hazard rate from the subsequent job match. Workers who exited the
UCS after the time of benefits exhaustion exhibit a 32 per cent higher probability of their
subsequent employment relationship being terminated through the ending of a temporary
contract in comparison with the hazard of workers who did not exhausted their previous un-
employment benefits.
In the estimation of the hazard rate from a job due to layoffs (either collective or individ-
ual), the variables related to the individual’s previous labour market experience present in
general the same sign as previously, although they differ in the magnitude of the estimated
effects. The exception is the categorical variable controlling for the termination of the prior
employment relationship, which shows a statistically significant negative sign. This implies
that the probability of job termination due to a layoff diminishes a 57 per cent if the previous
employment finished in consequence of the ending of a temporary contract.
As we saw earlier, the longer the duration of the previous job match, the lower the haz-
ard rate from a job. But now this negative effect is lower than in the case of jobs terminating
due to the end of a temporary contract. This may suggest that job stability gained by workers
in their previous employment relationships is more important for workers in temporary jobs
as a signal for employers that their productivity is not low. At the same time, previous
non-employment duration affects positively the probability of job termination due to a lay-
off. This finding reflects that past non-employment duration has a scarring effect on subse-
quent job duration, being the effect larger on future permanent jobs.
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Finally, the exhaustion variable also indicates that workers who move to the employ-
ment state after having exhausted their previous unemployment benefits face a significant
higher chance of leaving a job through a layoff. Nevertheless, this positive impact is lower in
this case (1.10 times) compared to job termination through the ending of a temporary con-
tract (1.32 times). This evidence suggests that workers who exhausted their unemployment
benefits but happened to find a job with a permanent contract enjoy less stable employment
experiences than workers who did not exhaust their benefits and found a permanent job, al-
though they are relatively better than those individuals who were not able to access to such
jobs.
Our next step is to consider the effects of other covariates included in the estimations.
Men have a significantly 12 per cent lower probability of exiting a job than women when the
reason for termination is the ending of a temporary contract. This means that men present
longer employment durations than women when the reason of the exit from employment is
the ending of a temporary contract 17. However, there are no significant differences between
men and women as for job termination due to a layoff 18. Compared to workers aged less
than 25, the hazard rate for job termination due to the ending of a temporary contract is lower
for the rest of workers (especially for those aged more than 45). In the case of job termina-
tion due to layoffs, prime-age workers (25-40 years old) are less likely to exit. In addition,
having children does not affect the probability of exiting from a job.
The dataset does not provide us with variables related to the individual’s educational at-
tainment and occupation. However, there is a variable concerning the workers’ job category
in former employment relationship that allows distinguishing very broadly between
non-manual and manual occupations. Results are somewhat mixed. In general, it seems that
non-manual categories (especially the first one) present a positive and statistically significant
coefficient. Workers in manual occupations also have a significantly higher probability of
exiting a job than the reference when the reason for termination is the ending of a temporary
contract. For exits that are consequence of layoffs, results indicate that workers in manual
jobs are relatively less likely to terminate their employment relationships.
Wages present a disincentive effect on the hazard rates for job termination either due to
the ending of a temporary contract or due to a layoff: the higher the daily wage, the lower the
probability of job termination.
Regarding the effect of local labour market characteristics on job duration, the model es-
timations also include either dummies to take account of the existence of regional differ-
ences or a continuous variable on the regional unemployment rate. Using the dummies (not
reported in the table), compared to the regional reference category (Andalucía, where the
share of temporary workers over total workers is the highest in Spain), the rest of regions
present a lower hazard rate for job termination in consequence of the ending of temporary
contracts. Regions where this hazard is specially low are Madrid, Cataluña, Aragón, and La
Rioja, i.e. regions with unemployment rates below the national average. However, regarding
the exit due to layoffs, differences among regions are less marked. When we use the regional
unemployment rate as a measure of demand side factors, we find that it is positively corre-
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lated with the hazard rate from a job due to a layoff: workers are laid off when labour de-
mand is low and unemployment high. This result is consistent with other studies showing
that layoffs are countercyclical (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995, and Böheim and Taylor,
2002).
Finally, we address that the estimation results favour the gamma heterogeneity specifi-
cation because the size of the variance of the gamma mixture distribution relative to its stan-
dard error suggests that unobserved heterogeneity is significant. This result means that exit
rates from jobs that follow the ending of a temporary contract (or a layoff) are affected not
only by the measured individual and job characteristics and previous labour market history
of workers but also by their unmeasured characteristics.
When comparing estimation results with and without (not reported) unobserved hetero-
geneity components, we find that the estimated coefficients and the value of the log-likeli-
hoods are affected by the inclusion of controls for unobserved heterogeneity. On the one
hand, the unobserved heterogeneity component increases the log-likelihood values in the es-
timations, therefore improving the fits of the models. On the other hand, there are some dif-
ferences in the coefficients for some variables (gender, age, wages) that increase the magni-
tude of the parameters of the exit rates from jobs that follow the ending of a temporary
contract. The likelihood ratio test of a model with unobserved heterogeneity against that
without also suggests the same conclusion that unobserved heterogeneity is significant.
4.3. Some extensions
We are interested in further investigating the relationships between the effects of some
characteristics of previous employment and non-employment spells and of workers and jobs
on subsequent employment durations. Table 3 displays the estimate results from interacting
some variables 19.
First, we analyse the effect from interacting gender with duration of previous employ-
ment spell, duration of previous non-employment spell, exhaustion of previous unemploy-
ment benefits, and reason for prior job termination. Results suggest that the rise in the hazard
rate from a job due to the ending of a temporary contract is magnified for men through the
duration of previous employment and non-employment spells and through the termination of
the former job match due the ending of a temporary contract. However, the exhaustion of un-
employment benefits seems to be less scarring for men: a 36.17 per cent less (a point esti-
mate of –0.308 – 0.141 = –0.449). These interactions are found to have an insignificant ef-
fect on the probability of job termination due to a layoff (only the duration of previous
non-employment spell has a significant positive influence).
We have also tried some interactions between the effects of age, occupation and charac-
teristics of previous spells. Regarding age, we are interested in looking at the influence of
two variables on the hazard rate from a job for workers aged over 45: the reason for former
job termination and the exhaustion of unemployment benefits. Although the exit rate is lower
for those workers relative to those aged 25 or less, the interaction terms suggest that the
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Table 3
Some extensions (controlling for unobserved heterogeneity)
Variable
End of a contract Layoff
Coeff. Std. Signif. Coeff. Std. Signif.
Gender
Men –0.308 0.048 *** 0.020 0.089
Women — — — — — —
Age
> 20 and 4 25 — — — — — —
> 25 and 4 30 –0.552 0.015 *** –0.287 0.037 ***
> 30 and 4 35 –0.537 0.020 *** –0.347 0.046 ***
> 35 and 4 40 –0.429 0.024 *** –0.236 0.056 ***
> 40 and 4 45 –0.416 0.028 *** –0.146 0.062 ***
> 45 –1.155 0.058 *** –0.248 0.084 ***
Duration (months) in:
Previous employment –0.014 0.001 *** –0.019 0.002 ***
Previous non-employment 0.004 0.001 *** 0.017 0.002 ***
Reason for termination of previous job match
Ending of a contract 0.521 0.040 *** –1.162 0.074 ***
Layoff — — — — — —
Exhaustion of previous unempl. benefits
Yes 0.355 0.022 *** 0.136 0.053 ***
No — — — — — —
Men and
Previous employment duration (months) 0.003 0.001 *** –0.001 0.002
Previous non-employment duration (months) 0.004 0.001 *** 0.006 0.002 ***
Previous unempl. benefits exhausted –0.141 0.028 *** –0.073 0.069
Previous job match (end of contract) 0.182 0.038 *** 0.021 0.065
Aged > 45 and
Previous unempl. benefits exhausted 0.108 0.053 ** 0.389 0.101 ***
Previous job matches (end of contract) 0.654 0.063 *** –0.104 0.101
Previous employment duration and
Previous job match (end of contract) –0.013 0.001 *** 0.018 0.002 ***
Previous job match (end of contract) and
Unskilled manual workers in subsequent job –0.089 0.046 –0.741 0.085 ***
Gamma variance 0.434 0.022 *** 0.744 0.131 ***
*
2 (Prob > *2) 591.053(0.000) 61.577(0.000)
Log-likelihood —116,882.221 –30,199.663
Observations individual-months 402,918
Notes:
— Regression also controls for regions, job category, wages, children, regional unemployment rate, calendar and
business cycle dummies and duration dummies variables. *2 statistics refers to testing model with unobserved hete-
rogeneity against that without.
— *** indicates significance at 1 per cent; ** indicates significance at 5 per cent.
probability of job exit due to the ending of a temporary contracts doubles for workers aged
over 45 if they terminated their prior job match due the same reason (a point estimate of
1.175 for workers aged 45 and above compared to 0.521 for workers under 45). This interac-
tion is not significant for the probability of job exit due to a layoff. However, the exhaustion
of unemployment benefits significantly increases this latter probability (it also increases the
former). This means that the scarring effect of benefit exhaustion is magnified for workers
aged over 45 relative to those aged 45 or less.
The impact of the interaction term of reason for prior job termination and being working
in manual, less skilled occupations is relevant for the exit rate from a job due to a layoff. Re-
sults indicate that, while workers in manual, unskilled occupations face a significantly
greater probability of leaving a job than the reference (manual, skilled workers), the hazard
rate decreases when those workers come from a job terminating due to the ending of a tem-
porary contract.
Finally, the interaction between the reason for previous job termination and duration of
that spell of employment shows interesting results. The longer the duration of prior job
match (if termination was due to the ending of a temporary contract), the lower the probabil-
ity of terminating the subsequent job match due to the same reason. This adds to the reduced
effect that duration of prior employment spells exerts on the hazard rate. This seems to sug-
gest that accumulation of work experience have a positive influence on the stability of future
job matches. However, the influence of previous employment relationships does not appear
to work the same way in the case of permanent jobs, since what makes some difference in
subsequent duration is duration in prior permanent matches.
5. Conclusions
This paper has aimed at analysing the effects of previous labour market experiences on
subsequent job duration for Spanish workers over the 1980s and the 1990s. In particular, we
have investigated how the subsequent employment relationship of unemployed workers is
affected by previous labour market experiences: the reason for termination of previous job
matches, the duration of previous employment and non-employment spells, and the exhaus-
tion of unemployment benefits received by workers in their prior unemployment spell. To
focus on these issues, we have used information related to the first two employment spells
and the intervening non-employment spell of a sample of Spanish workers from the adminis-
trative dataset HSIPRE.
The findings from our analysis suggest that there is a scarring effect of previous non-em-
ployment duration on subsequent job duration: the longer the time spent in non-employment
since previous job separation, the shorter the duration of subsequent re-employment relation-
ships. This result is consistent with the job search theory which predicts shorter job duration
after longer non-employment spells: unemployed workers will decrease their reservation
wage as time passes by, accepting jobs which are more likely to be destroyed. This makes
those workers more likely to experience more unemployment in the future (Pissarides,
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1992). In contrast with this effect of non-employment duration, we have also found a posi-
tive influence of previous employment experiences on future jobs: the longer the job stability
experienced by workers in their previous employment engagements, the lower the exit rate
from the subsequent job.
Other results refer to the reason for termination of prior employment relationships. The
evidence points out that workers whose previous job match terminated due to the ending of a
temporary contract are very likely to come back to employment under another temporary job
and have a higher probability of job termination (their new employment engagements last
less time). This suggests that there is a group of workers who are involved in a «temporary
employment-unemployment-temporary employment» cycle. If this is related to the seasonal-
ity of the economic activity, it is difficult to judge, although it seems that seasonal contracts
in Spain is not as large as one might expect (see Dolado et al., 2002).
Finally, the exhaustion of unemployment benefits —which may partially be interpreted
as a proxy for individual differences in either job search intensity or reservation wage— also
seems to exert a scarring effect on job duration: workers who exit the unemployment state
before the time of exhaustion find more durable and stable jobs than workers who exhausted
their previous unemployment benefits. This result is consistent with search theory that pre-
dicts longer job duration after shorter unemployment spells because of the higher probability
of receiving job offers with high wage and, therefore, more durable and stable jobs.
Hence, our results highlight that there are specific categories of unemployed workers for
which the scarring effect of previous non-employment in terms of increasing the probability
of re-entering unemployment is most important: those who come from temporary employ-
ment, those who wait until the exhaustion of unemployment benefits to accept a job, and
those with longer non-employment spells. These effects are also magnified for some other
categories of workers, as those aged over 45.
Previous studies having detected this scarring effect are those by Heckman and Borjas
(1980), Arulampalam et al. (2000), Gregg (2001) and Böheim and Taylor (2002). The exis-
tence of scarring suggests that public policies aimed at preventing unemployment would
have a long-term impact on aggregate unemployment. As scarring seems to be particularly
important in the case of the long-term unemployed and older workers, public programmes
aimed at the prevention of long-term unemployment and targeted to particular groups of
workers should be in the public agenda. At the same time, active labour market policies to-
wards job finding would be efficient since they can reduce individual unemployment dura-
tions and speed up the return to employment. However, it is important to consider the effect
of excessive rotation on the functioning of active policies: one risk of these programmes
is that they can be successful to move the unemployed into work in the short-run but these
individuals return quickly to unemployment. In other words, we can observe that mea-
sures which increase labour market flexibility raise the hazard rates from unemployment to
employment but also those from employment to unemployment (García-Fontes and Ho-
penhayn, 1996).
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Moreover, appropriate on-the-job training and more stable jobs would avoid deprecia-
tion in acquired skills and undesirable effects linked to the employment-unemployment
chain. Supply-side policies that make individuals more employable and increase work incen-
tives should go hand in hand with demand-side policies to generate more (stable) employ-
ment. In addition, EPL and UCS should be designed to avoid the use of temporary contracts
for permanent activities and of unemployment benefits to combine employment and covered
unemployment spells which are not justified.
Notes
1. On the part of firms, there are some firms (especially working on specific sectors of economic activity) who
lay off a portion of their workforce in certain periods of the year (months of summer and Christmas time) and
then hire those workers again in months such as September and January, once they have used their correspon-
ding unemployment benefits. On the part of workers, they can work some months during several years and ac-
cumulate the necessary twelve months of contributions to get access to the unemployment insurance benefits
(instead of the unemployment assistance benefits) and then use them in months of inactivity.
2. There are works on job duration, such as García-Fontes and Hopenhayn (1996), García-Serrano and Malo
(1996) and García-Pérez (1997), but they do not analyse the influence of previous labour market experiences
and the different reasons for job termination.
3. There are two groups excluded from the files by definition, since they can not receive unemployment benefits:
workers who quit and workers with very short-time contracts whose contribution periods are below the mini-
mum.
4. HSIPRE data have also been used to analyse the exit from unemployment by Cebrián et al. (1996) and Gar-
cía-Serrano (1997). However both studies focus on a single cohort of UI entrants in June 1990. Other works
using the HSIPRE data for a larger period of time (1987-1993) are Arranz and Muro (2001) and Jenkins and
García-Serrano (2003).
5. Although information on protected unemployment spells and benefit parameters is very complete, information
on marital status and educational attainment, for instance, does not exist. In addition, more details on the for-
mer job (industry, firm size, redundancy payments) are, unfortunately, not available in the dataset.
6. Table A.1 provides descriptive statistics for these individuals. As compared with workers with at least two
unemployment incidences, they were slightly working in more qualified occupations, proportionately more
with permanent contracts and in jobs with longer employment durations.
7. The selection of a sample of workers with at least two employment spells may create a non-random sample be-
cause we have dropped workers with only one job interruption who do not report information on two job mat-
ches and their corresponding employment durations. If this is not properly taking into account, the estimated
exit rates may be biased. To correct this potential non-randomness, we have estimated a reduced form probit
model (as one cross-section) on the presence in the sample. We have included the associated Heckman correc-
tion term as a regressor in the hazard rate equation. Results indicate that the correction term is not significant
and the estimated coefficients in the equation are unchanged. This seems to point out that this type of selection
is random. Estimates for the probit model are available from the authors on request.
8. As the number of individuals experiencing unemployment spells after being collectively laid off is very small
(1.4 per cent), we have decided to merge spells ending due to individual (11.1 per cent) and collective layoffs.
In addition, in this analysis we have excluded observations terminating due to «other reasons» (0.1 per cent of
total observations).
9. Figures not reported here indicate that workers who are collectively laid off are those who benefited from job
matches characterised by having the longest durations and the highest wages. Employment engagements finis-
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hing due to individual layoffs are situated in between. This finding is very interesting. The asymmetric infor-
mation theory argues that plant closure gives a less negative signal than individual firing, since workers losing
jobs that way avoid being labelled as low-ability workers (Gibbons and Katz, 1991). Therefore, the prediction
would be that workers losing jobs due to plant closure are expected to suffer smaller losses (in terms of future
wages or job stability) than workers who have been selected for layoffs. Our results are consistent with that
prediction.
10. The definition of non-employment refers to covered unemployment (workers receiving unemployment bene-
fits) for those who do not exhaust those benefits, adding information on extra time of either unemployment
without receiving benefits or inactivity for those who do exhaust those benefits.
11. We have also found that previous unemployment benefits’ exhaustion state also influences the survival and
the duration of subsequent employment matches: those who exit unemployment before exhaustion appears to
find more stable and durable jobs. This additional information can be found in Arranz and García-Serrano
(2003a).
12. This latter probability is not considered here because we do not have the possibility of observing job-to-job
transitions in our dataset, as mentioned in section two.
13. This semi-parametric approach has found applications in the study of unemployment duration (Meyer, 1990;
Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993) and employment duration (Böheim and Taylor, 2002).
14. Alternatively, the distribution can be approximated non-parametrically (Heckman and Singer, 1984). Howe-
ver, the choice of gamma distribution is made for computational reasons, which could be debatable (Narendra-
nathan and Stewart, 1993).
15. All estimations were performed using Stata 7.0 with a programme (pgmhaz) written by Jenkins (1997).
16. The ratio of the hazard rate of an individual with a dummy variable equal to 1 to the hazard rate of the referen-
ce is exp(). The percentage of increment (detriment) in the hazard rate is calculated as (exp()–1)*100.
17. There are no previous empirical works obtaining this result. Looking at the INEM statistics (duration of tem-
porary contracts by type and gender), they show that about 60 per cent of male workers with an eventual con-
tract have durations of one month or less, while this proportion increases to nearly 70 per cent for female wor-
kers; in the rest of duration categories (more than one month), the proportions are always higher in the case of
men.
18. The fact that men appear to have different hazard rates from jobs that follow the ending of a temporary con-
tract than women has motivated us to estimate separate models (not reported). The hazard rates do not present
special alterations (even having children does not affect the probability of exiting from a job).
19. Comparing models of Tables 2 and 3, we note that the inclusion of interaction terms is accepted on the basis of
the likelihood ratio test. The value of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the model that reports estimated exit
coefficients from jobs that follow the ending of a temporary contract (layoff) is 114.842 (327.838). This value
exceeds the critical chi square value of 15.507 for 8 d.f. at significance level of 5 per cent.
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Resumen
El objetivo de este artículo es analizar la influencia que tienen las experiencias laborales anteriores de los trabajado-
res españoles sobre la duración de sus futuros períodos de empleo. A partir de una base de datos administrativa del
INEM se observa que existe un efecto estigma en el mercado de trabajo español, porque cuanto mayor es la duración
de los períodos anteriores de no empleo, menor es la duración de los períodos siguientes de empleo. También, se
aprecia que los trabajadores que finalizaron el empleo debido al fin de su contrato tienen mayor probabilidad de vol-
ver a emplearse con un contrato temporal y de recaer nuevamente en el desempleo. Finalmente, los trabajadores que
agotaron una prestación por desempleo en el pasado presentan menores duraciones futuras en el empleo.
Palabras clave: duración del empleo, interrupciones laborales, no empleo, empleo.
Clasificación JEL: J24, J44, J63.
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APPENDIX
Descriptive statistics
Variables
Workers with two employment spells Workers with only
one employment spell1st employment 2nd employment
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Gender (men=1, women=0) 0.588 0.492 0.588 0.492 0.489 0.499
Age (years old)
> 20 and 4 25 0.561 0.496 0.337 0.473 0.404 0.491
> 25 and 4 30 0.206 0.404 0.332 0.471 0.238 0.426
> 30 and 4 35 0.094 0.291 0.143 0.350 0.136 0.343
> 35 and 4 40 0.062 0.242 0.078 0.268 0.093 0.291
> 40 and 4 45 0.045 0.208 0.055 0.229 0.069 0.254
> 45 0.032 0.176 0.055 0.228 0.059 0.235
Children (yes) 0.176 0.381 0.267 0.442 0.254 0.435
Job category
High level/associated professional techni-
cians and supervisors 0.059 0.235 0.076 0.265 0.082 0.274
Technical assistants and skilled clerical
workers 0.084 0.277 0.111 0.314 0.123 0.329
Semi-skilled clerical workers 0.038 0.192 0.044 0.204 0.034 0.182
Unskilled clerical workers 0.158 0.365 0.154 0.361 0.167 0.373
Skilled production workers 0.146 0.353 0.192 0.394 0.138 0.345
Semi-skilled production workers 0.186 0.389 0.175 0.380 0.166 0.372
Unskilled production workers 0.268 0.443 0.221 0.415 0.220 0.414
Missing 0.061 0.239 0.028 0.164 0.071 0.257
Duration (days)
Tenure in subsequent employ. 506.6 424.7 577.2 443.3 842.9 598.7
Previous unemployment — — 231.5 241.9 — —
Previous non-employment — — 380.2 367.3 — —
Accumulated tenure 506.6 424.7 1083.9 706.8 — —
Accumulated past unemployment — — 231.5 241.9 — —
Accumulated non-employment — — 380.2 367.3 — —
Daily wages (€-1990 prices) 20.2 8.2 22.5 9.7 22.5 10.7
Reason for job termination
End of contract 0.852 0.355 0.873 0.332 0.711 0.453
Collective layoff 0.130 0.336 0.111 0.314 0.244 0.429
Individual layoff 0.016 0.127 0.014 0.118 0.042 0.200
Others 0.002 0.043 0.001 0.037 0.004 0.061
Regions
Andalucía 0.187 0.390 0.187 0.390 0.177 0.382
Extremadura 0.018 0.135 0.018 0.132 0.020 0.139
Canarias 0.072 0.259 0.072 0.259 0.050 0.217
Asturias 0.019 0.138 0.019 0.137 0.022 0.146
Murcia 0.028 0.165 0.028 0.165 0.025 0.157
Castilla y León 0.046 0.209 0.044 0.206 0.046 0.209
C. Valenciana 0.107 0.309 0.108 0.310 0.105 0.306
Castilla-La Mancha 0.032 0.176 0.032 0.175 0.034 0.181
Galicia 0.060 0.238 0.060 0.238 0.061 0.238
País Vasco 0.037 0.188 0.036 0.187 0.043 0.202
Cantabria 0.009 0.097 0.009 0.096 0.010 0.097
Cataluña 0.157 0.364 0.158 0.364 0.176 0.381
Madrid 0.160 0.367 0.162 0.368 0.174 0.379
Navarra 0.010 0.100 0.010 0.100 0.011 0.105
Baleares 0.030 0.170 0.030 0.170 0.019 0.135
Aragón 0.022 0.147 0.022 0.146 0.025 0.155
La Rioja 0.005 0.069 0.005 0.070 0.006 0.075
Entry year 88.4 1.976 90.5 1.815 89.513 2.496
Exit year 89.9 1.717 92.5 2.059 91.854 2.287
Sample 65,340 65,340 187,273
